Why fentanyl must be designated a weapon of mass destruction

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

As recently reported in The Washington Times, the Department of Homeland Security is considering designating the opioid drug fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction. We view this as a viable decision and one that may be overdue; but doing so will require both an enhanced accuracy of terms and conditions and an acceptance of responsibility to act once such a declaration is made. Fentanyl’s potency is without doubt: It is approximately 100 times more powerful than morphine and 50 times more potent than heroin.

To date, the number of Americans who have died from opioid overdoes not only approaches 100 times the number of American fatalities in the 9/11 attacks but also surpasses all direct U.S. combat deaths incurred during World War II, and fentanyl overdoses strongly contribute to that number. Several months ago, authorities seized about 234 pounds of fentanyl in Nogales, Arizona, a supply estimated to be enough to kill more than 100 million people.

Recent estimates purport that there is enough fentanyl in the United States to kill every American numerous times over. The opioid impact is also economic. For example, in 2015 the opioid-related U.S. taxpayer cost was reported to be approximately $5,04B, an amount greater than that year’s Department of Defense budget. In this respect, the threat to our economy, public health and national security is clear and present.

The majority of fentanyl in the United States is illegally smuggled from Mexico, and China is playing a profound, albeit subtle role in providing Mexican cartels with the chemical ingredients required to synthesize fentanyl and its derivatives. The Mexican cartels are illegally moving drugs — as well as people — across our southern border, and in doing so, are preying upon our current social, political and economic vulnerabilities and volatilities.

This begs the question: If China is allied with the cartels for moving drugs into the United States, might these other vulnerabilities also be “targets” for China’s disruptive engagements? And, if so, toward what goals and objectives? Further, is China using the Mexican cartels as proxies, similar to the way the Soviets used Cuban forces in Africa and elsewhere during the Cold War?

Much of modern China’s national identity and political narrative is rooted in its so-called “Century of Humiliation” (mid-1800s-mid-1900s) which was a consequence of the West’s importation of opium from India into China. Reacting to this perceived national denigration and subjugation, China’s assumption of status as a — if not the — dominant global superpower involves a sense of payback to the West which is manifest across several vectors.

Keep in mind, however, that weapons are not only used in traditional warfare. By definition, a weapon is an instrument that can be utilized to leverage influence in a variety of ways. Increasingly, these ways are becoming non-combative (“non-kinetic”). For instance, the production, importation and distribution of lethal drugs are among several non-kinetic engagements that China effectively employs against the United States to disrupt, to diminish, and/or to destroy key elements of our national stability.

Yet, the history of America’s wars and longstanding military doctrine established by the Department of Defense have made conventional (“kinetic”) warfare the mode of engagement most familiar to both civilians and the military. When addressing, mitigating or preventing non-kinetic threats, especially those that occur during pre-conflict conditions, the principles and rules of kinetic warfare do not necessarily or appropriately apply.

Non-kinetic engagements often lack the grossly evident destructive outcomes of conventional warfare. They also are not intended for “destruction” in the classic sense but rather can and should be regarded as weapons of mass “disruption” to destabilize nations, societies, populations, and balances of power.